

Supplementary materials for the article: Grömping, Max (2017). 'Domestic election monitoring and advocacy: An emerging research agenda'. *Nordic Journal of Human Rights*, 35(4). doi:[10.1080/18918131.2017.1401776](https://doi.org/10.1080/18918131.2017.1401776)

Appendix A: Studies included in the review:

#	Reference	PR ¹	Country	Region	Study design/ method	Major finding/claim ²
1	Adebisi and Loremikan (2013)	N	Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa	Descriptive single case study	Training of volunteers and official accreditation by electoral authorities guard against partisan bias of domestic monitors.
2	Aranha, Ribeiro and Paraense (2016)	Y	Brazil	Latin America	Descriptive single case study	Crowdsourced count of vote tallies verifies official results and provides leverage for reform advocacy.
3	Arias, Garcia and Corpeño (2015)	Y	Honduras	Latin America	Descriptive single case study; participant survey	Crowdsourced count of vote tallies verifies official results and increases civic engagement.
4	Asunka, Brierley, Golden, Kramon and Oforu (2017)	Y	Ghana	Sub-Saharan Africa	Randomised field experiment	The presence of domestic monitors reduces electoral fraud and violence, but both are simply relocated to unobserved polling places depending on the level of local electoral competition.
5	Bader (2013)	Y	Russia	Eastern Europe & Central Asia	Descriptive single case study; descriptive statistics	Crowdmapping is a credible source of information about electoral malpractice, especially vote count fraud.
6	Bailard and Livingston (2014)	Y	Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa	Descriptive single case study; OLS regression analysis	Crowdmapping alerts electoral authorities, who in turn reallocate resources to problem areas, which subsequently increases turnout.
7	Birch and Van Ham (2017)	Y	Multiple	Multiple	Cross-national time-series; fixed effects regression analysis	Domestic monitors increase electoral integrity, especially when EMB autonomy is low (substitution effect).

¹ Peer-reviewed (Yes/No)

² This lists only findings/claims in regards to domestic election monitoring. Some studies may have a different overall research question but still show findings relevant for this review.

#	Reference	PR ¹	Country	Region	Study design/ method	Major finding/claim ²
8	Bjornlund (2004)	Y	Macedonia, Indonesia, others	Multiple	Descriptive comparative case study	Domestic monitoring increases trust in transitional election, can substitute for gaps in non-partisan electoral administration, and build civic skills (political organising).
9	Bjornlund, Bratton and Gibson (1992)	Y	Zambia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Descriptive single case study	Domestic monitors' effects on electoral integrity are contingent upon their neutrality, their ability to collaborate with international monitors, and the endorsement of the monitoring effort by state institutions.
10	Bock (2012)	Y	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	Descriptive single case study	The main challenges of crowdmapping electoral malpractice are verification of results and possible spread of rumors and false information.
11	Botero, Cornejo, Gamboa, Pavao and Nickerson (2015)	Y	Colombia	Latin America	Survey experiment	Information provided by domestic monitors about the corruption of political candidates is less credible to voters than the same information provided by newspapers.
12	Brajawidagd a and Chatfield (2014)	N	Indonesia	East & Southeast Asia	Descriptive comparative case study	An official open data policy and high social media use are both necessary conditions for success of crowdsourced quick counts
13	Bush and Prather (2017)	Y	Tunisia	Middle East & North Africa	Survey experiment	Positive (and negative) statements by domestic monitors about the integrity of an election increase (decrease) voters' perceptions of electoral integrity. Negative statements have an especially strong effect on partisans of the losing party.
14	Buzin, Brondum and Robertson (2016)	Y	Russia	Eastern Europe & Central Asia	Randomised field experiment	The presence of domestic monitors has little or no effect on vote count fraud.
15	Byington (1988)	N	Philippines	East & Southeast Asia	Descriptive single case study	Mass mobilisation of volunteer observers and parallel vote tabulation increase domestic monitors' capacity to detect electoral malpractices.
16	Callahan (1999)	Y	Thailand, Philippines	East & Southeast Asia	Descriptive comparative case study	Independence from state influence and the cultivation of non-partisanship enhance the impact of domestic monitors.

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17	Callen, Gibson, Jung and Long (2016)	Y	Uganda	Sub-Saharan Africa	Randomised field experiment	Photo quick count reduces vote count fraud and other irregularities.
18	Callen and Long (2015)	Y	Afghanistan	Middle East & North Africa	Randomised field experiment	Photo quick count reduces vote count fraud and other irregularities.
19	Cantu and Garcia-Ponce (2015)	Y	Mexico	Latin America	Pre/post-election voter survey	The presence of domestic monitors in a polling place has no effect on voter trust in the integrity of the election.
20	Carothers (1997)	Y	Multiple	Multiple	Descriptive comparative case study	Domestic monitors can substitute international monitors (more sustainable, cost-efficient, higher mobilisation).
21	Casas, Diaz and Trindade (2017)	Y	Argentina	Latin America	Natural experiment	The presence of political party observers (non-neutral) in polling places increases the vote share of the party to which these observers belong.
22	Celis, Krook and Meier (2011)	Y	Multiple	Multiple	Descriptive single case study of specific issue (gender quotas)	Domestic monitors increase the chance for electoral reform through advocacy activities
23	Chand (1997)	Y	Mexico/ Multiple	Multiple	Descriptive comparative case study	The presence of domestic monitors increases social capital and enhances agenda-setting of electoral reform.
24	Chernykh and Svolik (2015)	Y	N/A	N/A	Formal model	The presence of domestic monitors makes post-election protest more 'accurate'. Monitors do not need to be impartial to be politically consequential. Monitors with moderate pro-incumbent bias are acceptable to both opposition and incumbent.
25	Collier and Vicente (2014)	Y	Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa	Randomised field experiment	Anti-violence voter education campaigns by domestic monitors decreases perceptions of violence and intimidation as well as actual violence.
26	Debre and Morgenbesser (2017)	Y	Cambodia, Zimbabwe, Egypt	Multiple	Descriptive comparative case study	Reports of domestic monitors are less effective when drawn into doubt by conflicting reports of international 'shadow' election observers.

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27	El Baradei (2012)	Y	Egypt, Ethiopia, Ukraine, Nigeria	Multiple	Descriptive comparative case study	Coalition building, use of ICTs, professionalisation, and reform advocacy increase efficacy of domestic monitors.
28	Enikolopov, Korovkin, Petrova, Sonin and Zakharov (2013)	Y	Russia	Eastern Europe & Central Asia	Randomised field experiment	The presence of domestic monitors reduces vote count fraud.
29	Fearon (2011)	Y	N/A	N/A	Formal model	The presence of credible domestic monitors increases incentives for incumbents to provide demonstrably fair elections.
30	Fung (2011)	Y	USA	North America	Descriptive comparative case study	Crowdmapping is a potential tool for measuring electoral malpractice. Its efficacy may be threatened by participation bias, unverified reports and 'noise', and competition between different crowdmapping initiatives.
31	Grömping (2012)	N	Multiple	East & Southeast Asia	Descriptive comparative case study	Crowdsourced election monitoring is expected to increase social capital and deliberation, with mixed expected impacts on incentives for electoral manipulation.
32	Grömping (2014)	Y	Thailand	East & Southeast Asia	Descriptive single case study	Information about electoral malpractice is generated by network online publics. This can be considered a form of crowdsourced election monitoring. Efficacy is undermined by partisan polarisation of networked publics.
33	Grömping (2017)	Y	Multiple	Multiple	Cross-sectional; count model regression analysis	The organisational density of domestic monitors is driven by the interaction of grievances about electoral malpractice and political opportunities (freedom of association). Domestic monitors are most prevalent in hybrid regimes.
34	Hedman (1999)	Y	Philippines	East & Southeast Asia	Descriptive comparative case study	Mobilisation of domestic monitors is enhanced by ties to business networks and professional associations exist.
35	Hedman (2005)	Y	Philippines	East & Southeast Asia	Descriptive diachronic single case study	The transformation of domestic monitors into a mass-based social movement is aided by political opportunities favoring election-related

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						collective campaigns (rather than extra-electoral social mobilisation), pre-existing social ties, and readily available universalist collective action frames.
36	Hellström (2015)	Y	Uganda	Sub-Saharan Africa	Descriptive single case study; focus groups; user survey	Participation in crowdmapping initiatives is strengthened through feedback loops. Crowdmapping participation may be a substitute for traditional participation (voting).
37	Ichino and Schündeln (2012)	Y	Ghana	Sub-Saharan Africa	Randomised field experiment	The presence of domestic monitors decreases pre-electoral malpractice (voter registration), but malpractice is displaced to unobserved locations.
38	Igarashi (2008)	Y	Philippines	East & Southeast Asia	Descriptive comparative case study	Domestic monitors can substitute functions of electoral governance if electoral authorities are incapable or unwilling to perform them. Efficacy may be threatened by partisan bias of domestic monitors.
39	Khoo (2016)	Y	Malaysia	East & Southeast Asia	Descriptive single case study	Mass protest mobilisation by domestic monitors enhances their agenda-setting capabilities and increases electoral participation.
40	Lazarus and Saraf (2015)	N	Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa	Descriptive single case study; participant observation	Human verification of passively crowdsourced reports on electoral malpractice by trained domestic monitors increases efficacy.
41	Lean (2007)	Y	Mexico, Peru, Nicaragua, Haiti	Latin America	Descriptive comparative case study	A history of soft power (diplomatic, normative) intervention and low societal polarisation increase social capital production by domestic monitors.
42	Lean (2013)	Y	Mexico, Venezuela, others	Latin America	Descriptive comparative case study	High societal polarisation decreases social capital and norm production by domestic monitors.
43	Leeffers and Vicente (2017)	N	Mozambique	Sub-Saharan Africa	Randomised field experiment	The presence of domestic monitors decreases election-day malpractice (vote count fraud). The effect of domestic monitors is stronger than that of international monitors.
44	Little (2012)	Y	N/A	N/A	Formal model	Incumbents have a strong incentive to allow (domestic or international) monitors, in order to reduce (but not

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						eliminate) public expectations about how much fraud will occur. The presence of monitors reduces electoral malpractice.
45	Makulilo (2011)	Y	Tanzania	Sub-Saharan Africa	Descriptive diachronic single case study	Lack of professionalism, political ties, repression and dependency on donor conditionalities undermine impartiality and credibility of domestic monitors.
46	Merloe (2015)	Y	Azerbaijan, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, others	Multiple	Descriptive comparative case study	Endorsement of international standards of monitoring and codes of conduct signals credibility of domestic monitors. Conflicting election reports by GONGOs ('zombie monitors') undermine impact of domestic monitors.
47	Muntean and Gheorghiuță (2010)	N	Romania	Eastern Europe & Central Asia	Descriptive single case study; interviews; public opinion data	Advocacy by domestic monitors is more effective vis-à-vis the legislative than the executive. Perceived partisan bias of domestic monitors undermines efficacy.
48	Ndubuisi (2016)	N	Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa	Descriptive single case study	Absence of legal powers of domestic monitors undermines deterrence effect.
49	Nevitte and Canton (1997)	Y	Multiple	Multiple	Descriptive comparative case study	Domestic monitors increase social capital and political participation, in particular in the absence of international monitors. Perceptions of partisan bias of domestic monitors undermine efficacy.
50	Rueda (2017)	Y	Colombia	Latin America	Cross-sectional; survey data; count model regression analysis	Domestic monitors are effective in exposing electoral malpractice which are commonly under-reported by citizens (such as vote buying).
51	Saka (2017)	Y	Turkey	Middle East & North Africa	Descriptive single case study	Participation in digitally-enabled domestic monitoring is increased if it is embedded within a broader social movement.
52	Semenov, Lobanova and Zavadskaya (2016)	Y	Russia	Eastern Europe & Central Asia	Comparative case study; process tracing and descriptive statistics	High party institutionalisation and low degrees of co-optation increases political parties' constructive engagement with electoral reform movements and domestic monitors.

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53	Sjoberg (2012)	N	Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan	Eastern Europe & Central Asia	Comparative case study; randomised field experiment	The presence of domestic monitors reduces election-day malpractice (vote count fraud/ballot box stuffing). However, vote buying and intimidation are substituted for fraud.
54	Skokova (2015)	Y	Russia	Eastern Europe & Central Asia	Descriptive single case study; participant survey	Participation in domestic monitoring increases social capital. Participation is increased by active recruitment. Typical participants are on average highly politically engaged individuals.
55	Smyth, Meng, Moreno, Best and Zegura (2016)	N	Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa	Descriptive single case study	Human verification of passively crowdsourced reports of electoral malpractice increases efficacy.
56	Suryani (2015)	N	Indonesia	East & Southeast Asia	Descriptive single case study	Crowdsourced quick counts produce credible verification of election results.
57	Trujillo, Elam, Shapiro and Clayton (2014)	Y	Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	Descriptive single case study	Crowdmapping of electoral malpractices increases inter-ethnic bridging social capital. This in turn can help mitigate election violence.
58	Tuccinardi and Balme (2013)		Multiple	Multiple	Descriptive comparative case study	Endorsement of international standards of monitoring and embedding with international human rights instruments enhances efficacy of domestic monitoring.
59	Virgianita (2014)	N	Indonesia	East & Southeast Asia	Descriptive single case study	Networking/collaboration among domestic monitoring groups and direct international aid to them enhance efficacy of domestic monitoring.
60	Vowles (1995)	Y	New Zealand	Oceania		Advocacy groups promoting electoral reform are more likely to be successful if there are media allies, party system dealignment, and a political culture supporting populist democratic values.

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